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Discussions concerning business liability for the environment have traditionally centred on the role of 
large corporations. This is consistent with the extensive reach and impact of their activities. The vast 
majority of incorporated entities in the United Kingdom are small private companies, and thus 
collectively attract a substantial share of prosecution activity for environmental offences. This article 
contrasts the positive effects of criminal sentencing for environmental offences on the management 
of large companies, with the difficulty of attaching liability to the controllers of small companies. 
Recent developments in the field of company law have exposed a fault-line in the scope for imposing 
personal liability on legitimate small business operators, raising the broader question whether an 
improved approach to criminal sentencing is as pertinent to such businesses as they are to large 
businesses and illegal operators. This paper argues that these improvements should be more strongly 
complemented by support for such businesses to avoid non-deliberate breaches of the criminal law.  
 
A. Introduction  
The role and responsibility of companies with respect to the environment is a well-traversed subject 
in academic literature. Reflections on this matter range from analyses of the conflicts between the 
fundamental company law principles of limited liability or separate corporate personality, and the 
goal of protecting the environment,1 to companies’ ability to improve their compliance with 
environmental obligations by integrating hard and soft law principles into their decision-making 
processes.2 However, while some works focus on the position of large enterprises such as 
                                                          
* Liverpool John Moores Law School, b.c.mamutse@ljmu.ac.uk  
1 G. Dent, ‘Limited Liability in Environmental Law’ (1991) 26 Wake Forest Law Review 151 D. Bakst, ‘Piercing 
the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the United States and the European Union: The Case for the 
Proposed Civil Liability Directive’ (1996) 19 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 323; C. 
Schipani, ‘Taking it Personally: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Environmental Hazards’ (2001-2002) 27 
Journal of Corporate Law 29.  
2 C. Viliers, ‘Directors’ duties and the company’s internal structures under the UK Companies Act 2006: 
obstacles for sustainable development’ University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
No. 2010-03; J. Borck and C. Coglianese, ‘Beyond Compliance: Explaining Business Participation in Voluntary 
Environmental Programs’ University of Pennsylvania Law School, Public Law Research Paper No.12-06; C. 
Bradshaw, ‘The Environmental Business Case and Unenlightened Shareholder Value’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 
141. 
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 2 
transnational corporations,3 or acknowledge the particular problems associated with smaller 
companies,4 there is limited comparison of the types of environmental harm perpetrated by smaller 
businesses and larger businesses, and the effectiveness of legal responses that are adapted to 
businesses of different sizes. The new approach to sentencing for environmental offences has cast a 
spotlight on the corporate governance implications of poor environmental compliance, for larger 
companies, by contrast with the reduced scope for holding controllers of legitimate small businesses 
personally liable for damage resulting from environmentally harmful operations. This latter effect 
signals the importance of taking a more rounded view of the factors hindering compliance by 
legitimate small business operators. 
The need to differentiate between the treatment of large companies and small companies is especially 
relevant in the United Kingdom (‘UK’), where small businesses account for  99.3% of all private sector 
businesses and 51% of private sector turnover.5 Companies registration data shows that ‘private 
limited companies have consistently accounted for over 96% of all corporate body types’ since 2006.6 
An average number of 2 directors and 2 shareholders per company was recorded in 2016,7 reflecting 
very high concentration levels of ownership and control for a typical company in the UK. In addition 
to the demographic differences, contrasting consequences can be identified with respect to the 
conduct of large companies and small companies in the field of environmental liability. For example, 
water companies (that earn huge profits8) are frequently held to account for pollution offences.9 On 
                                                          
3 M. Anderson, ‘Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: is Tort Law the Answer?’ [2001-2002] 
41 Washburn Law Journal 399. 
4 K. Bergmann, “Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: Closing the Loophole and Parting the Veil” 
University of Maryland Public Law Research Paper No. 2004-02, p.2 – environmental remediation costs can 
bankrupt small companies; P. Bentata and M. Faure, ‘The role of environmental civil liability: an economic 
analysis of the French legal system’ (2012) 20 Environmental Liability: Law Policy and Practice  120, 121 – 
‘small firms can cause harm to a large number of individuals or to entire ecosystems’. 
5 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population Estimates for the UK and 
Regions 2017, 1. 
6 Companies Register Activities 2016-17 (Companies House, 2017), [1.1].  
7 Companies Register Activities Infographic 2016 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547010/Companies_Registe
r_Activities_infographic_2016.pdf (accessed 01/05/2018) 
8 e.g. R v Southern Water Services Ltd [2014] EWCA Crim 120, [16], noted that the defendant had a turnover of 
£0.75 billion in the previous year and profitability after tax of £156.9 million in 2013; Environment Agency, 
‘Severn Trent Water fined £426,000 for repeated raw sewage leak into the Shire Brook’ (22/07/2016) – Severn 
Trent Water had a turnover of £1,8 billion and pre-tax interest and profit of £512,6 million in the previous 
financial year. 
9 J. Ambrose, ‘Yorkshire Water hit with £600,000 pollution fine’ Telegraph (21/01/2016); ‘United Utilities and 
contractors fined almost £1 million for polluting brook with corrosive bleach’ Environment Agency press 
release (15/072016); D. Carrington, ‘Thames Water hit with record £20m fine for huge sewage leaks’ The 
Guardian (22 March 2017); R v Anglian Water Services Ltd [2003]  EWCA Crim  2243; R v Southern Water 
Services Ltd [2014 EWCA Crim 120; R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2010] EWCA Crim 202;  R v Thames Water 
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the other hand, there is a very high representation of small and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) in 
the area of waste crime. In 2003, it was estimated that SMEs generated roughly 60% of commercial 
waste and up to 80% of pollution incidents in England and Wales,10 and more recent research has 
established that 94% of businesses which fail to comply with their statutory obligations regarding the 
safe management of waste are SMEs.11 The causes of non-compliance range from a lack of awareness 
regarding their obligations12 to deliberate contraventions of the law, reaching the level of organised 
crime.13 The business model attached to waste management activities, whereby customers tender full 
payment in advance for the agreed services14 is attractive to dishonest operators due to its low entry 
costs, high profitability in the short-term, and ‘the low perceived risk of being caught and of 
subsequent enforcement action’.15 However, it also carries the risk that (even in relation to 
unintended non-compliance) the business lacks sufficient capital to carry out any clean-up of the 
damage resulting from its activities. While various preventative approaches may be taken to address 
non-compliance with environmental obligations,16 it is also vital for legal responses to non-compliance 
to be tuned to the relative needs of smaller and larger businesses – a dichotomy which has been 
addressed by the new Sentencing Guidelines for Environmental Offences, with ripple effects for the 
governance of larger companies, as discussed below. While this division may be regarded as axiomatic, 
it also presents a danger that the headline-grabbing effect of the successful prosecutions of large 
companies17 will overshadow some of the emerging difficulties of imposing liability on small business 
operators. This paper thus aims to demonstrate that criminal sentencing techniques will have a much 
more limited impact in relation to legitimate small business operators, a constituency that is strongly 
                                                          
Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960.  The large fine recently imposed on Tesco was for a health and safety 
offence and an environmental offence – J. Parsons, ‘Tesco fined £8m for major petrol spill’ ENDS (16/06/2017). 
10 Environment Agency, SME-nvironment Survey 2003, 1. 
11 Duty of Care Awareness Campaign Launched, Right Waste Right Place (12/04/2016); C. McGlone, ‘Waste 
Industry launches SME campaign to tackle waste crime’ ENDS (12/04/2016). 
12 According to the Head of Regulation at the Environmental Services Association, ‘Very few organisations 
want to actively flout the law, but most are simply not informed about what they have to do.’ Duty of Care 
Awareness Campaign Launched (ibid); Environment Agency, SME-nvironment Survey 2009, 4, 7.  
13 C. Mills, A Review of Waste Disposal at the Mobouy Site and the Lessons Learnt for the Future Regulation of 
the Waste Industry in Northern Ireland (2013), pp.1 ,2, 77, and paragraphs 5.27-5.30, 6.3. 
14 ‘Small firms and waste: an industry underwritten by the public purse’ 1998 ENDS 238, 31 
15 Defra, A consultation on proposals to tackle crime and poor performance in the waste sector & introduce a 
new fixed penalty for the waste duty of care (2018), [6]. 
16 e.g. ‘a proactive approach’ including reliance on intelligence resources, and collaboration between 
concerned agencies – Environment Agency, Cracking Down on Waste Crime: Waste Crime Report 2012-2013 
(Environment Agency, 2013), 13-17; Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, A Review of the Northern 
Ireland Environmental Agency’s Environmental Crime Unit (Department of Justice, 1.3). 
17 e.g. I. Kaminski, ‘South West Water nets its largest ever fine for polluting Devon stream’ ENDS (01/12/2015); 
Environment Agency, ‘Repeated raw sewage leaks, lead to one of the largest water company fines’ 
(25/09/2015). 
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affected by the activities of dishonest operators and yet may be constrained in their ability to avoid 
breaching their own legal obligations.  
 
B. Background: reforms to sentencing for environmental offences   
New sentencing guidelines for environmental offences were released in 2014.18 Prior to this, concerns 
had been expressed regarding the weakness of the sentencing framework. The levels of fine imposed 
were seen as being relatively low, inadequate to reflect the severity of offences or achieve a deterrent 
effect, and yielding inconsistent outcomes in similar cases.19 The guidelines provide separate 
principles for the sentencing of individuals and organisations.20 With respect to organisations, 
different starting points and ranges are prescribed for fining large, medium, small and micro-
organisations.21 Starting points for fines are gauged according to an organisation’s annual turnover;22 
though it is appreciated that certain defendants’ turnover may ‘very greatly’ exceed the threshold for 
large organisations,23 and that some small organisations may be quite similar in nature to individual 
offenders (necessitating some overlap in starting points for fines).24  
It is at these two extremes (largest and smallest organisations) that the implementation of a new 
approach to sentencing may be seen to have far-reaching implications, an observation supported by 
data collected to assess the impact of the guideline. A key finding from this data is that the majority 
of prosecutions, following introduction of the new guidelines, related to very large organisations and 
micro organisations.25 It is thus worth examining the extent to which the principle that any financial 
penalty ordered ‘must be sufficiently substantial to have a real economic impact which will bring home 
to both management and shareholders the need to improve regulatory compliance’26 manifests itself 
in relation to these two types of company. The impact of this principle is understandably more 
                                                          
18 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline (Crown, 2014). 
19 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences Guideline Consultation (Crown, 2013), 5; P. de Prez, ‘Beyond 
judicial sanctions: the negative impact of conviction for environmental offences’ (2000) 21 Environmental Law 
Review 11, 12.  
20 Definitive Guideline (n.18), 2. 
21  Definitive Guideline ibid, 6. 
22 Definitive Guideline ibid, 7. 
23 Definitive Guideline (n.18), 7; Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences: Response to Consultation (Crown, 
2014), 18.  
24 Response to Consultation (ibid), 19-20. 
25 Sentencing Council, Assessing the impact of the Sentencing Council’s Environmental offences definitive 
guideline (14/11/2016), 1. 
26 Definitive Guideline (n.18), 12. 
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apparent with respect to very large companies, whereas this goal is more difficult to achieve with 




C. The corporate governance effects of sentencing large companies 
The introduction of the sentencing guidelines for environmental offences in 2014 was marked by the 
imposition of ‘record’ fines for pollution offences on large water companies, ranging from £2 million 
to £20 million.27 These developments made a public impression, as conveyed by a news article 
attributing the size of the largest fine to the inception of the sentencing guidelines:  
Water companies have been the most frequent polluters of beaches and rivers in 
England and past fines were criticised as too low to deter these highly profitable 
companies that often offended repeatedly. But a change in sentencing guidelines in 
2014 is now leading to far heavier penalties…[O]ne source close to the issue told the 
Guardian recently: “The courts have basically added a nought. Once it gets to that 
level, the boards and shareholders of water companies start to take notice.”28 
For the year following the introduction of the guidelines, the ENDS publication compared 5 
prosecutions for major water firms – carrying sanctions of £1.5 million altogether and an average fine 
of £296,500 per prosecution, with 14 water company sentences during the previous year carrying 
overall fines of £1.3 million and an average fine of £94,036 per case.29 The achievement of the desired 
effect, to reach the management of  large companies, is illustrated by the statements made by the 
chief executive and managing director of United Utilities respectively, concerning fines of £300,000 
and £750,000, indicating that the company had since adopted corrective measures;30 and the court 
                                                          
27 D. Carrington, ‘Southern Water fined record £2m for sewage leak on Kent beaches’ Guardian, 19/10/2016; 
‘Thames Water given record £20.3m fine after 1.4bn litres of raw sewage pollute river, killing thousands of 
fish’ Telegraph (22/03/2017). 
28 D. Carrington, ‘Thames Water hit with record £20m fine for huge sewage leaks’ Guardian (22/03/2017). 
29 C. Francavilla, ‘Guidelines bring order to environmental sentencing’ ENDS (25/08/2015). 
30 S. Roach, ‘United Utilities fined £750k for “reckless failure” in raw sewage incident’ ENDS (05/03/2015); R. 
Salvidge, ‘United Utilities fined £300,000 for drinking water contamination’ ENDS (11/10/2017).  
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apology tendered by the managing director of Powerday plc for failures giving rise to £1 million in 
fines.31 
The size and impact of the fines is in keeping with the view that enforcement of regulatory obligations 
through the criminal law should be reserved for ‘the most serious cases of non-compliance’.32 
However, it is vital to acknowledge the emphasis which the courts placed on using fines as a means of 
strengthening the accountability of the senior management of very large companies, even before the 
introduction of the guidelines. The judicial approach to sentencing was underpinned by similar 
considerations regarding the intended deterrent effect of penalties for management and shareholders 
of companies, and the aggravating/mitigating features of offences.33 Re Southern Water Services Ltd34 
involved an appeal against a £200,000 fine for the discharge of untreated sewage into the sea by a 
company with ‘a record of persistent offending’.35 The Court of Appeal found that the board of 
directors had ‘failed to appreciate the seriousness of the criminality’ associated with this offence, and 
stipulated that  
in offences of the seriousness of the kind represented by this case it is incumbent on 
the Chief Executive and main board of the company - particularly one with a serious 
record of minor criminality which this company has - to explain to the court the cause 
of its offending behaviour, the current offence and its proposals for protecting the 
public from such further offending.36 
Accordingly, the court saw no basis for interfering with the fine imposed by the lower court, affirming 
that in the circumstances of this case it would have refrained from interfering with a fine ‘very 
substantially greater’ than the one appealed against.37 Similarly, in R v Sellafield Ltd; R v Network Rail 
Infrastructure Ltd38 the Court of Appeal concurred with the view that Sellafield Ltd’s failings in 
processing and disposal of waste evinced management failures that were attributable to a customary 
laxity or complacency within the company, and senior management should shoulder a share of 
responsibility for ‘the clearest negligence’ in circumstances where the failure could have been easily 
                                                          
31 Environment Agency, ‘Waste firm ordered to pay more than £1.2m for waste offences’ (13/04/2016) 
32 Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts: a Consultation Paper (Crown, 2010), 1.5.  
33 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2010] EWCA Crim 202, [39].  
34 [2014] EWCA Crim 120. 
35 Ibid, [18]. 
36 Ibid, [19]. 
37 Ibid, [21]. 
38 [2014] EWCA Crim 49. 
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avoided and quickly detected.39 The court drew on the statutory obligation to have regard to an 
offender’s financial position40 and a mirror principle in the Health and Safety Offences sentencing 
guideline regarding fines being ‘sufficiently substantial to bring home to management and 
shareholders’ the importance of legislative compliance,41 in reaching its conclusion that the £700,000 
fine would convey the seriousness of the offence to Sellafield’s directors and shareholders. It would 
also ‘provide a real incentive to the directors and shareholders to remedy the failures’ found to have 
existed, particularly any elements of laxity or complacency.42 With respect to non-dividend companies 
such as Network Rail, the company’s reduction of directors’ bonus remuneration in consequence of a 
poor safety record was regarded as an appropriate incentive for executive directors to reform the 
company’s offending behaviour.43 In R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd,44 the company appealed 
successfully against a £125,000 fine for river pollution. It argued, inter alia, that the fine was manifestly 
excessive as it took insufficient account of the voluntary pledge of £500,000 that it had made towards 
restoration of the river. Reducing the fine to £50,000, the Court of Appeal recognised that this 
‘exceptional’ reparation had ‘clearly brought the necessary deterrent message home’ to the 
company’s management, shareholders and others;45 and that the imposition of relatively modest 
sentences in such circumstances may divert attention from the seriousness of the offence.46 
Compared to SMEs, large companies are well-placed to shoulder voluntary expenses in the interests 
of ‘pre-empting public criticism and negative publicity’.47 
Overall therefore, the judicial approach prior to the introduction of the guidelines indicates how 
sentencing techniques were used to capture the attention of key corporate actors and galvanise 
changes in management practices. Indeed, in the 2015 decision in R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd,48 
the first case to be decided following introduction of the sentencing guidelines for environmental 
offences, the Court of Appeal echoed R v Sellafield Ltd in offering guidance on the approach for 
                                                          
39 [25]-[27], [31]. 
40 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.164. 
41 Sentencing Council, Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food Safety and Hygiene 
Offences: Definitive Guideline, 10. The overlap between these cases and the sentencing principles applicable to 
health and safety offences is acknowledged in R v Thames Water (n.33), [39] 
42 R v Sellafield (n.38), [65]. 
43 (n.33), [70]. 
44 [2010] EWCA Crim 202. 
45 Ibid, [55]. 
46 Ibid, [56].  
47 P. de Prez, ‘Beyond judicial sanctions: the negative impact of conviction for environmental offences’ (2000) 2 
Environmental Law Review 11, 20.  
48 [2015] EWCA Crim 960. 
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sentencing ‘very large commercial organisations run for profit.’49 It noted that while ‘no amount of 
management effort can ensure that no unauthorised discharge can ever occur’,  
[e]ven in the case of a large organisation with a hitherto impeccable record, the fine 
must be large enough to bring the appropriate message home to the directors and 
shareholders and to punish them. In the case of repeat offenders, the fine should be 
far higher and should rise to the level necessary to ensure that the directors and 
shareholders of the organisation take effective measures properly to reform 
themselves and ensure that they fulfil their environmental obligations.50 
A significant mitigating effect would be provided by ‘[c]lear and accepted evidence from the Chief 
Executive of Chairman of the main board that the main board was taking effective steps to secure 
substantial overall improvement in the company’s fulfilment of its environmental duties’.51 It was 
noted that in the absence of the explanation provided by the company’s External Affairs and 
Sustainability Director, the facts of the case and the company’s record of prior offences would ‘have 
required the Court to take a starting point for a fine significantly into seven figures’.52 
The potential impact of sentencing techniques aimed at influencing the conduct of the managers and 
shareholders of large companies is especially important in relation to defendants that are large private 
companies owned entirely by parent companies53 or by professional shareholders;54 compared to 
public companies that are quoted on the Stock Exchange, and thus subject to wider share ownership 
and listing requirements.55 Indeed, a key benefit of the sentencing guidelines is that they permit the 
resources of any organisation linked to an offender to be taken into account;56 a factor recognised as 
salient in R v Ineos ChlorVinyls Ltd where the defendant company was operating at a loss but capable 
of obtaining any necessary finance from its parent company.57 This enables the courts to circumvent 
the fundamental principle that ‘each company in a group of companies …is a separate legal entity 
possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities’.58 As the prospect of fines exceeding £100 million 
                                                          
49 Ibid, [33]-[42]. 
50 Ibid, [42]. 
51 Ibid, [41]. 
52 Ibid, [45]. 
53 e.g. Network Rail, R v Sellafield Ltd (n.38), [7]. 
54 e.g. Sellafield Ltd, R v Sellafield Ltd ibid, [7]; R v Southern Water Services Ltd [2014] EWCA Crim 120, [1], [16]-
[17]. 
55 P. Davies, Introduction to Company Law (2nd edn OUP, 2010), 15-16.   
56 Definitive Guideline (n.18), 6. 
57 [2016] EWCA Crim 607, [12], [20]. 
58 Albacruz v Albazero [1977] AC 774, 807. 
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becomes increasingly realistic,59 this device may come to play a more significant role in circumstances 
where an offender lacks the financial capacity to discharge its fines.  
Although the introduction of the guidelines is credited with inducing ‘far greater engagement from 
senior managers of large companies’,60  there is a danger that companies may come to regard accruing 
a series of convictions as an inevitability of trading.61 Hence, a welcome development is the proposed 
introduction of ‘a voluntary set of corporate governance principles for large private companies’62 
aimed at enhancing the governance and scrutiny of the UK’s largest privately-held businesses.63 This 
reflects a recognition of the high degree to which governance and actions of such companies can affect 
the interests of a variety of stakeholders,64 and the operation of the principles will be specially 
pertinent to sectors where the majority of companies are private, 65 more reliant on debt than equity 
financing,66 owned by holding companies67 (accordingly, not subject to the type of oversight 
associated with stock exchange listing or dispersed share ownership), and benefit from low levels of 
competition in their sectors.68  The corporate governance principles also have the potential to provide 
an important counterweight to one of the uncertainties identified with respect to the sentencing 
guidelines, namely that they do not indicate what constitutes ‘very large organisations’ or stipulate 
appropriate starting points or ranges of fines for such organisations.69 Consequently, the approach to 
sentencing organisations with a turnover exceeding £1 billion is being developed through the high-
profile cases that fall for prosecution.70 While much will depend on the ultimate substance and 
implementation of the principles, a company’s assertions that it is incorporating wider interests into 
its decision-making, would be difficult to square with a weak record of compliance with its 
environmental obligations; particularly if these failures show that returns to shareholders71 or lower 
                                                          
59 R v Thames Water (n.48), [40]; J. Thornton, ‘Significant UK Environmental Law Cases 2016/17’ (2017) 29 
Journal of Environmental Law 367, 374. 
60 P. Kellett, The EA’s approach to enforcement undertakings’ 2016 ENDS 493.  
61 de Prez, (n.47) 22.  
62 DBEIS, Corporate Governance Reform: Government Response (Crown, 2017) 3.27. 
63 Ibid, 36-42. 
64 Government Response, ibid 3.23; DBEIS, Corporate Governance Reform: Green Paper (Crown, 2016) 3.2.  
65 Comptroller and Auditor-General, The economic regulation of the water sector (National Audit Office), 37-
39. 
66 Ibid, 9, 34. 
67 Ibid, 40; J. Cox, Observations on the regulation of the water sector (Ofwat, 2013), 8. 
68 de Prez (n.47), 18. 
69 Definitive Guideline (n.18), 7; U. Azmeh, Judicial warning – deterrence and large organisations’ (2015) 2 
Sentencing News 12; L. Harris, ‘R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd sentencing – environmental offences- very large 
organisations’ 2015 Criminal Law Review 739. 
70 R v Thames Water (n.44), [33]-[42]; R v Sellafield (n.38), [7]. 
71 Cox, (n.67) 4. 
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operating costs72 are prioritised over other stakeholder relationships. Criminal sentencing manages 
these stakeholder relationships to some extent, as seen in the recent prosecution of Thames Water 
where Sheridan J directed that the company should fully internalise the £20 million fine rather than 
passing on the cost to its customers.73 However, measures of this nature are essentially reactive, and 
should not detract from businesses’ ability to deploy proactive and creative approaches to their 
promotion of stakeholder interests. 
 
D. Sentencing challenges with regards to smaller companies 
The impact of the sentencing guidelines on small companies has not attracted the same level of 
judicial comment or media attention as the penalties imposed on large companies.  This is consistent 
with the Environment Agency’s prediction that the guidelines would have a greater effect on fines for 
very large, large and medium-sized organisations than on individuals and smaller organisations.74 The 
goal of deterring commission of future offences has been pursued through the imposition of 
confiscation orders.75 In cases involving smaller enterprises, confiscation orders have consequently 
been imposed for amounts as high as £1.99 million, even in instances where a nominal fine is awarded. 
76 Confiscation is the second step to be considered in the sentencing of organisations or individuals in 
Crown Court cases,77 and the significant role that such orders play is recognised by the Mills Report, 
which calculated that confiscation orders in 25 environmental cases between 2009-2013 yielded 
almost £700,000 more than fines in 470 environmental cases between 2003-2013.78 In addition to the 
deterrence function, confiscation orders also provide a means of ensuring compensation for 
environmental damage, for example to fund an environmental regulator’s clean up of illegal waste,79 
or in situations where innocent landowners might otherwise be burdened with responsibility for 
                                                          
72 N. Parpworth, ‘The Environmental Offences Sentencing Guideline and the Court of Appeal’ 2016 Journal of 
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clean-up costs.80 The Report nonetheless observed that the highly profitable nature of waste crime 
meant that confiscation orders did not have a sufficient deterrent effect.81 
Against this backdrop, the outcome of R v Powell82  raises questions regarding the extent to which the 
effects of a tougher sentencing approach should be felt by the controllers of legitimate small 
businesses. This Court of Appeal judgment centred on the issue whether confiscation orders made 
against JP and JW, directors and shareholders of Wormtech Ltd (‘Wormtech’), could be varied 
upwards. JP and JW had been convicted of consenting or conniving as directors in Wormtech’s failure 
to comply with the conditions of its environmental permit. The company had a permit for a 
composting facility on land belonging to the Ministry of Defence (‘MoD’). The conditions of the permit 
were repeatedly breached, resulting in pollution of the site that had to be cleaned up by the MoD (as 
landowner) and the State at a cost of roughly £1.125 million. Among other sanctions, confiscation 
orders had been made against JP and JW, who were found to exercise control over the company 
(although there were 3 other shareholders). Although Wormtech was initially charged with offences 
together with JP and JW, the prosecution was not pursued after it went into liquidation. This left the 
burden of any financial recovery to be borne by JP and JW. Thus the Crown argued that JP and JW 
should be held liable for the pecuniary advantage that Wormtech had derived from its failure to 
comply with the permit or to clear up the site once it became polluted. This necessitated some 
argument regarding the circumstances in which the corporate veil could be pierced in criminal cases.83 
In particular, the question whether the principle in R v Seager &  Blatch84 that the veil of incorporation 
should be torn away where an offender had committed criminal offences in the name of a company 
that resulted in the offender’s conviction85 could be reconciled with the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,86 that the courts may disregard the corporate veil in cases where the 
evasion principle applies. This principle is invocable where an independent legal right exists against 
the controller of a company, and the corporate form is interposed for the purpose of using the 
company’s separate legal personality to ‘defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement’.87 In Powell, the 
Court of Appeal took the Seager & Blatch principle as one which required the court to take account of 
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‘the nature and extent of the criminality involved’.88 Where the issue of piercing the corporate veil 
arose in confiscation proceedings, a relevant distinction could be made between cases where an entire 
enterprise was lawful, and cases where the lawful provision of goods/services was tainted by 
illegality.89 Factors worth noting in this case were that the company had been founded for the 
legitimate disposal of food waste, and obtained the necessary permits and suitable premises for this 
purpose.90 It had expended a significant amount on consultants and the costs of compliance with 
regulations and the permit.91 JP had made substantial personal investments into the company, and 
finance agreements, and suffered a considerable personal loss on its failure; JW had also provided 
guarantees for Wormtech’s debts.92 The nature of criminality thus showed that this was a legitimate 
business that had breached the criminal law through non-compliance with regulations, rather than a 
device for abusing the corporate shield.93 Notably, for the application of the evasion principle, there 
was no identifiable ‘right, liability, obligation or restriction’ on JP or JW that existed separately from 
Wormtech94 – their criminal liability as managers/officers  arose in ‘a secondary way’, 95‘parasitic upon 
proof that the company had committed an offence’.96 Thus, in the absence of evidence that 
Wormtech’s legal personality had been used to defeat or frustrate the enforcement of some right 
against JP or JW, the conditions for attaching liability for clean-up costs to the two could not be 
fulfilled. 
The outcome of the Powell case should be viewed in light of the equivocal response to the evasion 
principle articulated in Prest, despite the momentous nature of the latter decision. Within the 
Supreme Court, Lady Hale expressed doubts as to whether ‘it is possible to classify all of the cases in 
which the courts have been or should be prepared to disregard the separate legal personality of a 
company neatly into cases of either concealment or evasion’.97 Lord Mance and Lord Clarke likewise 
cautioned against foreclosing ‘all possible future situations which may arise’.98 Lord Neuberger agreed 
with the separation between evasion and concealment cases,99 but had reservations whether certain 
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cases100 identified in Lord Sumption’s lead judgment as instances in which the veil had been correctly 
pierced  according to the evasion principle,101  could have been resolved differently.102 Academic 
commentary regarding Prest has fastened on the inconclusive nature of the evasion/concealment 
labels,103 the potency of the notion that evasion is/should be the only form of abuse justifying veil-
piercing;104 and whether the precedent canvassed by Lord Sumption fully supports the demarcation 
between evasion and concealment.105 This untidiness envelops authorities such as Buckinghamshire 
CC v Briar,106 a well-known case on veil-piercing in the environmental context. Mr and Mrs Briar were 
held liable for the (£1.27 million) costs of cleaning up unlawful tipping on land that they had owned 
before it was registered in the name of a company that was found to be a ‘mere façade’.107 The court 
held that the case fulfilled the veil-piercing criteria accepted in Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 2),108 a 
case whose designation in Prest as an example of the concealment principle is subject to debate.109 
There is some consensus though that the Prest decision has restricted the scope for veil-piercing 
‘down to a margin which is close to zero’110 or ‘to a point of near extinction’.111 Legitimate small 
business operators in a similar position to JP and JW in Powell may also derive some assurance from 
the lack of ‘a different approach to the separate legal identity of companies’ in the context of 
confiscation proceedings112 and the courts’ emphasis that decisions regarding personal liability in 
confiscation matters should be tailored to the facts and circumstances of each case.113 In the setting 
of environmental offences, these factors appear to deflate the sentencing aims of punishment, 
deterrence and reparation.114 However, it is doubtful whether these aims should be accorded the 
same level of prominence with respect to legitimate small operators as they warrant concerning illegal 
operators and large companies, when considered against the difficulties experienced by such small 
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businesses. For example, in situations where profit margins are squeezed by the actions of illegal 
operators,115 legitimate operators may be more inclined to grasp any competitive advantages that 
flow from non-compliance with their obligations.116 In R v Powell, the Court recognised that 
Wormtech’s profit margins had been low,117 and that failure to comply with regulations at the material 
time stemmed from a desire to increase its profitability.118 Insofar as the penalties for illegal activity 
that undermines responsible business are still perceived as being an inadequate deterrent,119 this 
seems likely to continue. Weak compliance records and rudimentary strategies on the part of SMEs 
are also attributed to their limited financial, human and technological resources.120 Added to this, 
empirical research has found that ‘SMES only consider non-compliance to be an issue if raised by a 
regulator and only “serious” if prosecuted’.121 This is illustrated by the prosecution in R v Rory J 
Holbrook Ltd,122 where the determination of the defendant company’s culpability included a finding 
that there was no employee within the company who was suitably qualified to make appropriate 
applications for permits and exemptions, nor an internal monitoring system to enable the company 
to detect when it was acting unlawfully, or to investigate and react to deposits of suspect waste;123 
despite a previous conviction some years earlier for depositing waste without a waste management 
licence.124 Reports of other small business prosecutions also indicate that defendants lacked the 
financial capacity to address problems when they first arose, with the result that the situation grew 
beyond their control;125 and that the inadequacy of the company’s risk prevention systems and 
infrastructure stemmed from the owner-manager’s lack of prior research combined with the 
unexpectedly rapid growth of the company.126 The facts of R v Powell furthermore show how a 
regulated business’s compliance may be affected by the competing demands and expectations of its 
stakeholders.127 The courts acknowledged that Wormtech ‘had provided a valuable service for some 
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years to the communities it served,’128 but experienced difficulties in effecting structural changes to 
the site due to the reluctance of the MoD (as owner of the site) to permit such adjustments to be 
made.129 Thus, contrary to the perception that third parties can exert a positive influence on business 
compliance where they control resources that are important to a business,130 stakeholder 
demands/expectations may diminish a business’s legal compliance.131 Given the MoD’s status as one 
of the UK’s largest  landowners,132 this presents a missed opportunity to act as a surrogate regulator,133 
at a time of growing concern regarding the Environment Agency’s resources and reduced regulatory 
capacity.134 Furthermore, it highlights that some of an SME’s most powerful stakeholders may fall 
outside the scope of the legislative and soft law controls imposed by mechanisms such as directors’ 
duty to promote the company’s success with regard to the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships135 and the impact of its operations on the community and environment,136 or the 
Corporate Governance Code.137 
The role of confiscation orders as ‘a tool designed to take the profit out of crime’138 therefore applies 
weakly to legitimate small business operators in these circumstances. The combination of factors 
beyond their control indicates that an enforcement approach that is (primarily) reliant on criminal law 
interventions is an inadequate means of ensuring greater compliance with their environmental 
obligations. Similarly, it is arguable that the punishment, deterrence, reform/rehabilitation and 
reparation objectives of sentencing139 miss their target with respect to legitimate small business 
operators, insofar as the causes of their non-compliance may not be solely/mainly attributable to 
weaknesses in their governance. On the other hand, continued concern regarding the proliferation of 
rogue operators signifies that the stricter sentencing approach will not suffice to neutralise their 
incentives to engage in criminal activity.140 
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It is indisputable that the sentencing guidelines for environmental offences were a welcome 
development, and that they have made a visible impact since their introduction. The gains seen with 
respect to very large companies in particular risk obscuring the difficulties associated with a stricter 
sentencing approach for smaller businesses. Where these small businesses happen to be legitimate 
operators, a renewed approach to sentencing provides a limited solution to the causes of their non-
compliance, and efforts to seek redress in the form of personal liability for company controllers may 
collide with the ebb of veil-piercing doctrine. Insofar as the causes of such non-compliance stem from 
the actions of illegal operators, the insufficiently deterrent effect of criminal sentencing will ensure 
that this constituency continues to contribute to the pressures on legitimate operators. With regards 
to these two types of small business, it would accordingly be premature to celebrate the success of 
the sentencing guidelines. 
 
